Why do Bidder CEOs Get Disciplined Following Mergers?

Soegiharto, Soegiharto (2012) Why do Bidder CEOs Get Disciplined Following Mergers? The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research (IJAR), 15 (1). pp. 21-50. ISSN ISSN 2086-6887 (Print) ISSN 2655 - 1748 (online)

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Abstract

This study examines the effect of CEOs' behavior (overconfidence/less overconfidence), merger period (in-wave/non-wave), method of payment (stock/cash), industry of merged firm (across-industry/withinindustry), premium paid to target firm, and operating performance on the likelihood of a CEO turnover amongst bidding firms. Testing the US successful merger and acquisition data for the period of the 1990s, this study finds that the effect of merger waves and the method of payment on CEO turnover are positive and significant. Three measures of CEO behavior proposed and tested in this study, however, generally have insignificant effect on CEO turnover.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: CEO turnover, CEO overconfidence, Merger Waves, Method of Payment, Merger Premium, Operating performance.
Subjects: AKUNTANSI > Sistem Informasi Akuntansi
Divisions: Dosen STIE YKPN > Artikel > Jurnal
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email webmaster@stieykpn.ac.id
Date Deposited: 31 Mar 2023 02:12
Last Modified: 03 Apr 2023 06:34
URI: http://repositorybaru.stieykpn.ac.id/id/eprint/800

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